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Henry A. Wallace
and American Liberal
Politics, 1945-1948
Jerold A. Rosen
MOST HISTORIES OF POST-
World War II American poli-
tics have presented a rather
limited picture of Henry A.
Wallace. Wallace, secretary of
agriculture (1932-1940) and
vice-president (1940-1944) un-
der Franklin Roosevelt, secre-
tary of commerce (1944-1946)
under Harry Truman, and
presidential candidate for the
Progressive party (1948), has
been depicted as either an
idealistic pawn, manipulated
by Communists and fellow
travelers, or a prophetic and
conscientious Cold War critic.
These two views both as-
sume that Wallace maintained
unchanging attitudes on foreign policy from the death of Frank-
lin Roosevelt until Wallace's Progressive party campaign for the
presidency in 1948. While there were significant continuities,
there were also important transitions in his ideas.
In 1945, as the United States emerged from the fiery crucible
of war, Henry Wallace was one of the leading figures on the
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American political scene. An enthusiastic supporter of Roose-
velt's foreign policy, Wallace began to grow increasingly dissat-
isfied with what he perceived to be a major shift in emphasis on
the part of Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman. By 1948, the
time of his aborted attempt to capture the presidency, Wallace
had almost completely isolated himself from the mainstream of
American liberal thought. An examination of Wallace's position
on American foreign policy can provide a key to understanding
both the dynamics of his loss of stature as a national political
figure and also the changing attitudes of United States officials
on matters of Soviet-American relations.
The death of Franklin Roosevelt plunged the American
liberal movement into a state of crisis. Many liberals experi-
enced it as a tragic personal loss. Perceiving Roosevelt to be the
most extraordinary political symbol of the twentieth century—
the single most prolific instigator of progressive legislation the
nation had ever known—many liberals experienced feelings of
aimlessness and uncertainty at his death, refiecting the extent of
the mythology which had developed around him.
American liberalism, by 1945, had come to revolve around a
fairly well defined set of principles. These included racial equal-
ity, the support of democratic forces overseas, and international
economic security and development. Most liberals believed that
an ethic of cooperation would allow industry to function accord-
ing to the needs of the public welfare. Liberals envisioned a
society where the abundant material benefits of industry and
technology would eventually lead to a more humane system of
distribution. While capitalism was seen as a necessary ingred-
ient in this society, it was hoped that production based upon
need might ultimately replace the profit motive. Thus by advo-
cating the development of capitalism into something other than
itself, liberal theoreticians inadvertently committed themselves
to an ideology which was grounded in paradox. It was a system
of beliefs almost certain to produce continued delusion and dis-
appointment.
Roosevelt, the acknowledged leader of this liberal vision, had
provided a sense of unity which his successor, Harry Truman,
could not hope to approach. Liberals were troubled by Tru-
man's apparent lack of the characteristics which had made
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Roosevelt such an immensely appealing figure. While Roosevelt
was cosmopolitan and sophisticated, Truman had emerged
from a provincial, midwestern background. His cultural heri-
tage was not, the New Republic commented, "too well attuned
to the future of a world in depression, war, and revolution."' By
comparision with Roosevelt, who had been an overwhelming
mass leader and mobilizer of public opinion, Truman seemed
ineffective and uninspiring. Finally, there remained the stigma
of Truman's association with the infamous Pendergast machine.
LONG BEFORE ROOSEVELT'S DEATH, Henry Wallace had cap-
tured the liberal imagination and was a leading symbol of the
liberal spirit. When war broke out in Europe, Wallace rapidly
came to interpret the conflict in terms of an "Armageddon" of
liberalism. The struggle was clearly a contest between democratic
freedom and fascist totalitarianism; between the forces of human
reason and those of darkness. The war was not merely a contest
for survival, however, but a crusade to export liberalism to every
corner of the globe. Wallace was fearful of a recurrence of the
economic chaos which took place after World War I. He was
apprehensive that America would retreat into the isolating posi-
tion often induced by a policy of economic nationalism. To avert
this disaster, Wallace continually encouraged Roosevelt to con-
centrate on developing a systematic program of economic coop-
eration between the United States and competitor nations. An
equitable peace settlement, Wallace hoped, would eliminate the
economic rivalries which had begun the war. In the postwar
world, "there must be genuine democracy in approaching the
problems of the human soul and access to raw materials."^
Wallace deemed the war a "second chance" for America.
Now at last the world might be transformed into a society pre-
dicated on universal justice and harmony. Here, for the second
time in a single generation, was an opportunity to eliminate
"human suffering and poverty."' Wallace saw World War II as
the dramatic event in a 150-year-old people's revolution. After
'"President Truman's Task," New Republic. CXII (April 23, 1945), 540.
'Norman D. Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and
American Liberalism. 1941-1948 (New York, 1973), 46.
'HAW, "America's Second Chance," Address, April 8, 1941, reprinted in Congressional
Record. 11 Congress, 1 Session, A7663-64.
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the conclusion of the war, this revolutionary process would cul-
minate in a people's century. America had initiated the people's
revolution in 1776, and now America was morally obligated to
bring the fruits of her material abundance to the rest of the
world.
During World War II, Wallace's statements on foreign
policy echoed the liberal temper almost perfectly. The war had
evolved, for Wallace and his liberal followers, into an enlarge-
ment of the political antagonisms of the Depression. Wallace's
response became, in essence, merely an international extension
of the New Deal. His strategy for implementing his policies re-
quired ending all political and economic imperialism, and en-
couraging the more advanced nations, particularly the United
States, to aid development of industrial capacity in the back-
ward countries. His program also included the subjugation of all
cartels to international authority and the advancement of na-
tional self-determination everywhere. Wallace's plan, designed
to provide for an expanding economy of material prosperity and
abundance, would continue in effect until freedom from want
had been achieved for the entire world. It called for a pursuit of
war aims far removed from any attempt to reestablish the status
quo. A vigorous United Nations with some degree of police
power was to preside over this progressive course of action.
Wallace's theory of a united world necessitated the preserva-
tion of American-Soviet harmony. In the eyes of liberals, the
Soviet Union had come to achieve a vast degree of moral legiti-
macy by being a partner in the wartime anti-fascist alliance.
Wartime liberal rhetoric often fell into a sentimentalism which
all but ignored the realities of Soviet ambitions. Liberal jour-
nals, rationalizing and excusing the most brutal Soviet activ-
ities, denounced anti-Soviet critics for sabotaging Allied unity.
Most liberals regarded American-Soviet collaboration as the
foundation for the world-wide New Deal and the principal deter-
rent to a third world war.
Henry Wallace, originally unsympathetic toward the goals of
the Russian Revolution, gradually came to develop an admira-
tion for the maturing regime. Aside from his antagonism toward
Soviet atheism, Wallace's only other major criticism of Soviet
conduct was based on the menace that Russia posed to Ameri-
can agricultural exports.
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By the 1930s, Wallace had come to regard the international
situation as a confrontation between democracy and fascism.
Consequently, he envisioned the Soviet Union and the United
States as allies in a popular-front struggle between the civilized
nations and the totalitarian powers. And by 1942, Wallace
accepted the Soviet Union as an active participant in the peo-
ple's revolution which had first begun in America. Thus as was
the case with virtually all liberals, Wallace had come to view
American-Soviet friendship as the basic element in a functional
world-wide New Deal.
As the wartime alliance began to dissolve, virtually all liber-
als assumed that Franklin Roosevelt had developed the correct
formula for dealing with the Soviet Union. Roosevelt had proved
willing to concede Russian national security interests in eastern
and central Europe in return for continued Allied unity, Soviet
acceptance of United States interests in the Far East, and Soviet
support for the United Nations. He seemed to liberals to be per-
sonally responsible for the perpetuation of Big Three unity.
Not later than the first months of 1946 the principal Ameri-
can diplomatic policy planners* began to assume that the Soviet
Union had undertaken an expansionist tactic in eastern and
central Europe which would eventually involve the United States
in some type of major conflict, if not all-out war. "I'm tired of
babying the Soviets," Truman declared. "Unless Russia is faced
with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the mak-
ing."'
The majority of liberals felt that had he lived, Roosevelt
would have been able to preserve Allied unity. But Truman, the
liberal press said, had abandoned Roosevelt's foreign policies.
Whereas Roosevelt had possessed social grace and aristocratic
bearing, Truman was blunt and undiplomatic. And, although a
man of virtuous ambitions, Truman was judged by liberals as
having been driven toward a split with Roosevelt's foreign
policies by conservative state department advisers.
*By this date the main designers of United States diplomatic policy were Truman; James F.
Byrnes. Secretary of State; W. Averell Harriman, ambassador to Moscow; James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy; General Walter Bedell Smith; Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michi-
gan; and scholar-diplomat George F. Kennan.
*Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (New York, 1955), 552.
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Liberals who identified themselves with the legacy of the
New Deal became increasingly distressed over the apparently
deepening breech between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Their suspicions were dramatically realized when the
Truman administration initiated a "get tough" foreign policy.
Washington leaders began to make public both their antagon-
isms toward Soviet international conduct and their desire to see
America's diplomatic posture strengthened.
Perhaps the most significant event of these months was Win-
ston Churchill's March 5, 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri. The
address, which had been given Truman's unreserved approval
before it was delivered, was basically a plea that the United
States deal with the Soviet Union from a vantage point of over-
powering strength. This strategy of firmness constituted a dra-
matic shift away from the conciliatory attitude employed by
Franklin Roosevelt. The stance which Truman and Byrnes
adopted was contrary to Roosevelt's belief that the two nations
could coexist peacefully despite their vastly different economic,
social, and political systems. To ex-New Deal liberals, the Tru-
man administration seemed all too willing to align the United
States with corrupt and reactionary governments. It offered no
comprehensive and constructive system for the economic rede-
velopment of a decimated Europe. And it was destroying the
wartime anti-Fascist coalition. Many liberals, by this time, had
come to assume that United States hostility was the main deter-
rent in Soviet-American relations.
The shift to the right in foreign affairs created a deep cleav-
age within the liberal movement. By the summer of 1946, two
currents were beginning to emerge. One group, the cold-war lib-
erals, supported the president's increasingly anti-Soviet posture.
The second group advocated Soviet-American cooperation as a
necessary prerequisite to postwar economic development and
prosperity. These individuals, who shared the belief that the
United States could achieve friendship with the Soviet Union
without sacrificing vital national interests, gathered together
under the leadership of Henry Wallace.
Appointed secretary of commerce at the beginning of 1945,
Wallace had been given the post by Roosevelt as consolation for
his^ , Wallace's, failure to be renominated to the vice-presidency
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at the 1944 Democratic convention. Concerned at first with the
domestic economic situation, Wallace increasingly directed his
attention toward questions of foreign policy.
The issue of postwar control of atomic energy accelerated
Wallace's approaching estrangement from the Truman-Byrnes
foreign policies. At a time when most prominent government
officials claimed that the Soviet Union would never be scientifi-
cally capable of developing atomic weaponry, and that the
United States must carefully guard its bomb formula against
Soviet discovery, Wallace claimed that it was meaningless to
operate on the assumption of an atomic monopoly which would
prove impossible to preserve. He agreed with the atomic scien-
tists who advocated an open exchange of scientific information
with Soviet intellectuals.
Wallace believed that the control of atomic energy was the
most critical issue which then confronted the United States. In-
correctly perceiving Secretary of State Byrnes to be the primary
advocate of the hard-line approach toward Russia, Wallace
assumed it would still be possible to persuade Truman to return
to the cooperative policy of Roosevelt. But by the spring of 1946,
it seemed clear that New Deal attitudes were rapidly ceasing to
be a dynamic force within the Truman administration. Wallace
was the final New Dealer remaining in the cabinet. He was re-
garded with suspicion, hostility, and viewed as a political pa-
riah. His presence was maintained strictly for the purpose of
preserving party unity.
Increasingly agitated by the deterioration of American-
Soviet relations, Wallace began to work on an extensive position
paper in the spring of 1946. In it he expressed his concerns over
the current direction of American foreign policy. He finally sub-
mitted his statements to President Truman in the form of a
letter on July 23.
In his memorandum, Wallace gave an account of the histor-
ical factors which contributed to Russia's distrust and fear of
the West. Throughout her history, Wallace explained, both be-
fore and after the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia was made to en-
dure a succession of foreign invasions. In this context, the ex-
pansive United States military program must clearly appear
hostile and threatening. Wallace then proceeded to advocate the
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strengthening of American-Soviet friendship through the devel-
opment of strong economic ties. Trade negotiations could "well
clear away the fog of political misunderstanding." The delicate
problem of Russia's relationship with Eastern Europe might
"more readily be solved once an atmosphere of mutual trust and
confidence is established and some form of economic arrange-
ments is worked out. . . ." As Wallace also noted, the question
of Soviet postwar reconstruction and development seemed to
offer "tremendous opportunities for American goods and Amer-
ican technicians."^
When Truman failed to respond, Wallace made the decision
to resign from the Cabinet after the November elections. He also
decided to emphasize foreign policy in his campaign speeches.
The first presentation came at Madison Square Garden in New
York City on September 12, 1946, and it ultimately led to Wal-
lace's dismissal from the Cabinet.
Due to the critical nature of his text, Wallace decided he
would personally clear it with the president rather than send a
prepared copy of the speech to the White House for routine
clearance. On September 10, Wallace conferred with Truman
for nearly thirty minutes. Wallace was later to state that the
president read the entire text of the prepared speech. Truman
listened patiently, Wallace said, while he carefully clarified and
explained various passages, and elaborated upon certain signifi-
cant statements. Truman later claimed that he and Wallace met
for only fifteen minutes, concentrated primarily on domestic
issues, and focused on the text of the approaching speech merely
as an afterthought. Because of the brief duration of the meeting,
Truman said, "there was, of course, no time for me to read the
speech, even in part."*
The overall significance of the Madison Square Garden
speech was that it implied only limited concessions to the
Soviets. These concessions involved no sacrificing of primary na-
tional interests by the United States. Indeed, the speech con-
tained several specifically anti-Soviet references.
What the entire episode seemed to reveal most clearly was
'Wallace's letter of July 23 was not made public until September 17. It «as later reprinted
under the title, "The Path to Peace with Russia," New Republic. CXV (September 30, 1946),
401-06.
'Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston. 1947), 576; Truman. Yrar m Drcisics. 557.
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the essentially monolithic structure in which American foreign
policy was devised. The speech merely presented a succinct sum-
mary of Wallace's previous criticisms of United States foreign
policy. Recapitulating the historical basis for Russian fears of
the West, Wallace warned that a hard-line policy toward Russia
would never work, because the "tougher we get, the tougher the
Russians will get." The Soviets had legitimate security interests
in Eastern Europe just as the United States had vital national
interests in the Western Hemisphere. Wallace, therefore, pro-
posed a sphere of infiuences approach to foreign policy. "We
should recognize," he said, "that we have no more business in
the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the
poiitical affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the
United States." But, Wallace continued, the Soviets must not
under any circumstances attempt to extend their infiuence be-
yond the boundaries of Eastern Europe, especially in the form of
stirring up native communists to political action. Eastern
Europe must remain accessible to American economic activity,
Wallace said, because America could not allow the "door" to be
closed against trade in Eastern Europe.'
At the same time that Wallace spoke in New York, Secretary
of State Byrnes was in Paris at a Foreign Ministers Council
meeting of the United Nations. Byrnes was attempting to nego-
tiate European peace treaties with the Soviets, and was engaged
in the delicate process of reiterating America's opposition to
Soviet actions in Eastern Europe when the Garden rally took
place. Wallace's blanket endorsement of a sphere of infiuences
approach to international relations naturally caused immediate
speculation and concern among foreign diplomats about the
possibility of a drastic shift in the direction of American policy.
In an attempt to dispel any notions of such a shift. Presi-
dent Truman held a special press conference on September 14.
Truman, who permitted no questions from the newsmen who
were present, tried to explain that he had approved only Wal-
lace's right to express his opinions and not the opinions them-
selves. Truman closed the press conference with a final succinct
'The text of Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech appeared in the New York Times,
Septeniber 13, 1946. It was reprinted in Vital Speeches, XII (October 1, 1946), 738-41.
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comment: "There has been no change in the established foreign
policy of our Government."'
Truman's statements to the press did little to subdue the
mounting controversy. In Paris there was still confusion as to
the true nature of American policy. And as the controversy con-
tinued unabated, the American press began to turn against
Wallace.
On September 17, Wallace informed presidential press
secretary Charles Ross that he intended to make public the en-
tire contents of the confidential memorandum he had sent to
President Truman in July. Newspaper columnist Drew Pearson
had obtained excerpts from someone in the State Department,
and Wallace now attempted to prevent certain quotations from
being taken out of context and used against him. A Wallace
spokesman, therefore, released a prepared statement: "In view
of the fact that a copy of Secretary Wallace's letter of July 23,
1946 to the President was filched from the files and is in the
hands of a newspaper columnist, the Secretary of Commerce is
today releasing this copy of the letter."'
Rather than easing the political tension which surrounded
the controversy, this course of action was destined to have
exactly the opposite effect. On September 18, Secretary of State
Byrnes, still in Paris, finally broke his long silence. Byrnes im-
mediately offered his resignation unless Truman publicly repu-
diated Wallace and thereby silenced the rumors about a possi-
ble shift in American policy.
On September 20, Truman, anxious to avoid further dis-
advantageous publicity, telephoned Wallace and asked for his
resignation as secretary of commerce. "Henry," Truman said,
"I am sorry, but I have reached the conclusion that it will be
best that I ask for your resignation."'° Wallace calmly replied:
"Why, yes, Mr. President, if that is your wish; certainly!""
Approximately half an. hour after this exchange Truman re-
"Press Conference No. 82, Saturday, September 14, 1946, 2 p.m., page 2, Harry S. Truman
Library (Independence, Missouri). Quoted in Markowitz, 'People's Century. 186.
'Press release, September 17, 1946. Quoted in Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H.
Schapsmeier, Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, ¡940-1965 (Ames,
Iowa, 1970), 158.
'"Truman, Year of Decisions, 560.
"Lord, Wallaces of Iowa, 582.
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ceived a message from Wallace. It read: "As you requested,
here is my resignation. I shall continue to fight for peace. I am
sure you will join me in that great endeavor."'^
Most liberals responded to the secretary of commerce's
forced resignation with resentment and hostility. Quite natu-
rally they assumed that Wallace was the only figure in American
liberal politics with enough prestige and stature to provide the
leadership necessary to unify the movement. By the time that
Truman demanded Wallace's resignation, many liberals felt
that the Truman administration had severed any claim to iden-
tity with the heritage of the New Deal. Wallace was the final and
most prominent symbol of the Roosevelt administration. His
dismissal seemed to point toward Truman's ultimate rejection of
New Deal policies.
After his sudden departure from the Cabinet, Wallace began
his attempts to unite those liberals who still sympathized with
his belief in the necessity of Soviet-American cooperation. In
October, Wallace announced that he had accepted the editor-
ship of the New Republic. He then promptly set out on an inter-
national speaking tour. In his speeches and in his New Republic
column, Wallace constantly challenged the principal assump-
tions of the American leadership. He was still hopeful, he said,
that the United States and the Soviet Union might be able to
reach some type of mutually equitable accord.
When President Truman announced his response to the
mounting crisis in Greece in March, 1947, he finally presented
to Henry Wallace a concrete issue around which Wallace could
center his critical accusations. On March 12, Truman appeared
before the Congress to request economic and military aid for
Greece and Turkey. The president asked for $400 million, and
prepared the United States to assume British obligations in the
Mediterranean.
Wallace and his supporters reacted strongly against the deci-
sion to provide aid to the reactionary Greek government, being
most disturbed by the administration's failure to supply assis-
tance through the auspices of the United Nations. In a March 13
radio address Wallace accused the administration of "betraying
to Harry S. Truman, September 20, 1946. Quoted in Schapsmeier and Schaps-
meier, frophet in Politics. 160.
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the great tradition of America" and leading the American peo-
ple into a "reckless adventure." The Truman Doctrine was
nothing more than a sophisticated version of a "military lend-
lease program." The United States would soon be compelled to
police "Russia's every border."'' From his editorial post at the
New Republic, Wallace began a series of articles vehemently
denouncing Truman's policies.
It was the emergence of the Marshall Plan in June, 1947,
which finally allowed many ex-New Deal liberals to accept the
Truman-Byrnes cold-war policies without completely surrender-
ing their Rooseveltian ideals. This potentially constructive pro-
gram for the redevelopment of the European economies specifi-
cally repudiated military aid and thus did not appear to be
directed against any particular nation or ideology. As originally
stated, the Marshall Plan was to provide economic assistance
to both Western and Eastern European economies. It was also
designed to include participation with the Soviet Union. In this
respect the proposal clearly incorporated the principal of One
World; a belief which was central to the liberal ideology which
Roosevelt had embodied.
The vast majority of liberals immediately declared their sup-
port for the new program. The anti-Communist, cold-war
liberals were, quite naturally, elated by the administration's
ambitious initiative. Of greater consequence, perhaps, was the
approval expressed by those who had originally aligned them-
selves with Wallace in opposition to the Truman Doctrine.
Wallace initially praised the Marshall Plan as a "great ad-
vance over the Truman Doctrine."'" But when the Soviet gov-
ernment declined to participate in the program, Wallace began
to regard the administration's proposal with uncertainty and
suspicion. He centered his criticisms around the administra-
tion's failure to dispense aid through the auspices of the United
Nations.
By the beginning of 1948, Wallace had come to believe that
the humanitarian goals of the original program were being sub-
"HAW, Radio Address, March 13, 1947, reprinted in Congressional Record. 80 Congress,
1 Session, A1329.
"HAW "Bevin Muddies the Waters," Ne^v Republic. CXVI (June 30, 1947), 11.
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ordinated to purely military objectives. The Marshall Plan,
Wallace felt, had become indistinguishable from the Truman
Doctrine. Both were essential elements in the Truman-Byrnes
policy of containment; both were designed to aid reactionary,
archaic regimes and partition Europe into two hostile power
blocs.
It was not until Harry Truman's unanticipated presidential
victory in 1948 that he achieved a substantial measure of accep-
tance with American liberals. Only then, after he had already
initiated the Marshall Plan, did Truman succeed both in resolv-
ing to a large extent the liberal split on foreign policy and ident-
ifying himself with the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt.
Wallace, by 1948, had arrived at a view of United States
foreign policy which proved to be the dominant theme of his
campaign for the presidency. But when he failed to support the
government's seemingly generous economic overture—the Mar-
shall Plan—Wallace placed himself in a position which was in-
creasingly more inconsistent with the ambitions of most liberals.
With the exception of Rexford Tugwell, no influential New
Dealer endorsed Wallace's presidential candidacy. Nor was he
supported by even a single important liberal publication. By
failing to acknowledge the necessity of the administration's
policy of containment, Wallace had isolated himself from the
mainstream of American liberal thought. In doing so, his
strength as a potent, pivotal figure in American politics was al-
most wholly neutralized.
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